bbb's Journal

Речь Фишера в Москве
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/061901.htm

Весьма поучительно.

Во-первых, не понимает природы цен и инфляции.

The economy is operating in an extraordinary fashion now. The current account surpluses of 18 percent of GDP last year and 12 percent of GDP expected for this year are not the sort of phenomenon that most industrial economies have to deal with. They pose a real dilemma for macroeconomic policy, because the reserve inflows they imply tend to cause a real appreciation and loss of competitiveness. This can come about through inflation or an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, but one way or another it is hard to avoid.

What can be done? Obviously, given the gains generated by the post-crisis devaluation, no one wants a significant real appreciation in the short run. So the choices are: to tighten fiscal policy; to sterilize reserve inflows; or a combination of the two.

Во-вторых, об августовском кризисе 98-го года. До сих пор воображает, что причина была в низкой собираемости доходов:

At the heart of the crisis was a fiscal problem: the central government was unable to collect revenues, it was dependent on the capital markets and external financing, and even so it was unable to pay its bills.

В-третьих, абсолютно ошибочное описание "альтернатив" (по Фишеру, альтернатив как бы и не было, в то время как это действительно был выбор из двух зол, причем в результате выбраны были оба):

There was at the time a discussion of whether to devalue or restructure the debt. On this issue, I share the view of Russian policymakers that there was no choice. You couldn't restructure the debt without being forced to devalue, and you couldn't devalue without being forced to restructure the debt. In the end Russia had to do both.

В-четвертых, любопытное сравнение-воспоминание:

There were only two nights during my time at the IMF when I was unable to sleep. One was the night before the Russian devaluation. My worrying didn't make any difference to what happened, but in terms of the magnitude of the impact on the rest of the world, I was right to worry. The other sleepness night was the night before the Brazilian devaluation, when I thought: "Here we go again. It's going to be Russia all over again. This will hit Latin America, then it will rebound to Asia, then it will hit Eastern Europe." But nothing happened, and the Brazilian devaluation was more the end of a crisis than the beginning. So, on that occasion I didn't need to worry.

Бедняга даже не понял, что он сказал. Ведь русский "импакт" был не в том, что случилась неизбежная и всеми ожидаемая девальвация (как в Бразилии), а том, что произошел неожиданный и преступный дефолт. Не будь дефолта, мог бы спать и в первый раз...