Thursday, September 4th, 2003

Time	Event
6:39p	Из последнего доклада GEP - история вьетнамского сома Официально вышел доклад банка Global Economic Prospects - 2004 (http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2004). Есть интересные моменты, прежде всего о протекционизме. Один из них - рассказ-вставка про печальную историю вьетнамского сома в Америке (пересказывается статья из НЙТ) - http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2004/chapter2.pdf Box 2.2 Swimming upstream: The case of Vietnamese catfish On July 22, 2003, the New York Times wrote the following editorial that illustrates well the vicissitudes of exporters in antidumping waters: . . . After embracing decidedly un-Marxist reforms, Vietnam became one of globalization’s brightest stories in the 1990’s. The nation, a onetime rice importer, transformed itself into the world’s second largest rice exporter and a player in the global coffee trade. The rural poverty rate was slashed to 30 percent from 70 percent. The normalization of ties between Hanoi and Washington brought American trade missions bent on expanding Vietnamese free enterprise. One of these delegations saw in the Mekong Delta’s catfish a golden export opportunity, with the region’s natural conditions and cheap labor affording Vietnam a competitive advantage. Sure enough, within a few years, an estimated half-million Vietnamese were living off a catfish trade nurtured by private entrepreneurs. Vietnam captured 20 percent of the frozen catfish-fillet market in the United States, driving down prices. To the dismay of the Mississippi Farm Bureau, even some restaurants in that state—the center of the American catfish industry—were serving the Vietnamese species. Soon . . . Vietnamese farmers were caught in a nasty two-front war being waged by the Catfish Farmers of America, the trade group representing Mississippi Delta catfish farmers. The Mississippi catfish farmers are generally not huge agribusinesses, and many of them struggle to make ends meet. But that still does not explain how the United States, the international champion of free market competition, could decide to rig the catfish game to cut out the very Vietnamese farmers whose enterprise it had originally encouraged. Last year . . . the American catfish farmers managed to persuade Congress to overturn science. An amendment, improbably attached to an appropriations bill, declared that out of 2,000 catfish types, only the American-born family—named Ictaluridae—could be called ‘catfish.’ So the Vietnamese could market their fish in America only by using the Vietnamese terms “basa” and ‘tra’. . . . Catfish Farmers of America, ran advertisements warning of a ‘slippery catfish wannabe,’ saying such fish were ‘probably not even sporting real whiskers’ and ‘float around in Third World rivers nibbling on who knows what.’ Not satisfied with its labeling triumph—an old trade-war trick perfected by the Europeans—the American group initiated an antidumping case against Vietnamese catfish. And for the purposes of this proceeding, Congressional taxonomy notwithstanding, the fish in question were once again regarded as catfish, not basa or tra. . . . Antidumping cases involve allegations that imports are being sold more cheaply than they are back home or below cost, practices rightly banned by trade laws. . . . In this case, the Commerce Department had no evidence that the imported fish were being sold in America more cheaply than in Vietnam, or below their cost of production. But rather than abandoning the Mississippi catfish farmers to the forces of open competition, the department simply declared Vietnam a “nonmarket” economy. The designation allowed it simply to stipulate that there must be something suspect going on somewhere—that Vietnamese farmers must not be covering all the costs they would in a functioning market economy. Tariffs ranging from 37 percent to 64 percent have been slapped by the department on Vietnamese catfish. . . . Prices along the Mekong crashed, as the exporters who buy his fish moved to protect their margins.. . . Faced with the prospect of losing their investment, [farmers] might be shocked to learn that [the] Commerce Department says they do not operate in a free market. . . The United States International Trade Commission, an administrative agency in Washington, provided its final verdict on July 23. The verdict stated that the American catfish industry was hurt by unfair competition due to dumping by Vietnam—making the tariffs permanent. Source: New York Times, July 22, 2003. Собственно, нашлась даже ссылка на полный текст статьи - http://www.fntg.org/news/index.php?op=read&articleid=729 Более того - нашелся целый безумный архив расследования этого дела в Департаменте торговли. Окончательное заявление - http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/0603/catfish_final_061703.html (catfish - прямо в названии документа). Но лучше всего - промежуточные, внутренние документы. Характерно, что расположены они в директории, так и называемой - http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/vietnam-catfish Самый фантастический, на мой взгляд, документ - это меморандум на девяносто с лишком страниц, лежащий по адресу http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/vietnam-catfish/vietnam-frozen-fish-fillets-final-decision-memo.pdf. Его все-таки стоит открыть и прочитать любую страницу наугад. Вот, например, претензии к одной из вьетнамских фирм, производящих этого несчастного сома: ( суровые недостатки ) Дураку ведь ясно - если какая-то вьетнамская фирма сообщила вашингтонскому начальству данные о составе своих издержек за период с ноября по октябрь, а не с апреля по март, как от них, дикарей, ясно требовали, да еще не всю подноготную о своих вице-директорах рассказали, то и рыба ихняя американскому покупателю вредна и мерзопакостна, почему и следует обложить ее 60-процентной пошлиной. (3 Comments | Comment on this)
6:53p	Антидемпинговые дела И вообще - сам список текущих, незавершенных дел есть песня. Можно смотреть дела в разрезе стран - http://web.ita.doc.gov/ia/suncase.nsf/e86ff5260787d0818525698100645e13!OpenView Видно, что рекордсмен - естественно, Китай. Против него тянется 84 дела. Далее - страны, против которых от десяти дел и выше. Против: Кореи - 54, Тайваня - 50, Японии - 49, Италии - 37, Канады - 35, Франции - 33, Бразилии - 32, Индии 29, Германии - 27, Мексики - 23, Англии - 19, Испании - 14, ЮАР - 12, Таиланда - 12, Турции - 10, Венесуэлы - 10 Индонезии - 10, Малайзии - 10 Список по номерам дел - http://web.ita.doc.gov/ia/suncase.nsf/6d47b24e9c6a020f85256b1400660d27!OpenView По продуктам - http://web.ita.doc.gov/ia/suncase.nsf/0637147107b1be4785256745005af2b7!OpenView Какие названия! Carbon And Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Trinidad And Tobago Silicomanganese from Venezuela Fresh Cut Flowers from Ecuador Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina Welded Stainless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden Color Negative Photo Paper & Chemical Components from Netherlands Animal Glue & Inedible Gelatin from Germany Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Latvia In Shell Pistachios from Iran Oil Country Tubular Goods from Israel A-508-602; Oil Country Tubular Goods from Israel Axes and Adzes from People's Republic Of China Garlic, Fresh from People's Republic Of China Bulk Aspirin from People's Republic Of China И так далее до бесконечности. Кругом враги! (Comment on this)
7:05p	А вот, на мой взгляд, самый интересный кусок - про Новую Зеландию Есть такая теория, популярная во всех странах, от США до России - мол, если не защищать отечественного фермера, то он сразу вымрет и разорится. Параллельно этой теории существует ее зеркальное отражение - мол, если развитые страны ликвидируют свой сельскохозяйственный протекционизм, то развивающиеся страны сразу заработают много-много миллиардов (недавно популярна была цифра 300 миллиардов в год). Я целый год, как мог, пытался охладить страсти и говорил, что даже если протекционизм исчезнет (что в ближайшей перспективе крайне нереалистично, мягко говоря), то произойдет всего-навсего adjustment в сельском хозяйстве самих развитых стран, выгода распределится между потребителями и эффективным фермерами, а развивающимся странам рассчитывать на особую лафу с этой стороны не стоит. И вот, наконец-то, банковские люди провели собственный анализ на примере Новой Зеландии - единственной развитой страны, которая совершила резкий скачок от сельскохозяйственного протекционизма и огромных субсидий фермерам к небывалой либерализации. Результаты - для настоящего экономиста оказались вполне предсказуемые, для публики в целом, включая подавляющую часть тех, кто считается экономистами - полнейший сюрприз. Сюрприз настолько неожиданный, что его просто игнорируют, не замечают, считают не существующим. Итак: Box 3.6 Fewer subsidies, stronger agricultural sector There is a strong belief among policymakers in OECD countries that trade reform in agriculture would destroy their rural communities and the agricultural sector. Yet, as the experience of one OECD country shows, protection and subsidies are not a necessary condition for the continued growth of the farm sector. Indeed, the removal of protection can be accompanied by faster agricultural growth and increases in productivity, achieved without a significant decline in the farming population or its standard of living. Today, New Zealand has the lowest level of farm support among OECD countries—its producer support, estimated to be around 1 percent of the value of agricultural production, is primarily dedicated to research funding. This was not always the case. Producer support reached 33 percent of output in 1983, when almost 40 percent of the income of an average sheep or cattle farmer came from government subsidies. Yet, these policies were clearly unsustainable, as the loss of preferential access to the British market and an escalating inflation spiral led the government to abandon most payments to agricultural producers. Government deregulation was quick and substantial. Nearly all subsidies were removed in 1984. The sectors involved included wheat, egg, milk, potatoes, honey, raspberries, hops, tobacco, apples, poultry, pork, and other meats. Altogether, almost 30 different production subsidies and export incentives were abolished (Bell and Elliott 1993). The government made only limited efforts to soften the impact on farmers; those who decided to exit the agricultural sector received a one-time “exit grant” of approximately two-thirds of annual income. At the time, estimates pointed to 8,000 farms (10 percent of total) going out of business, prompting widespread opposition to the government’s plan. However, only 800 farms exited the market, and those that remained became more dynamic. Since Box 3.6 Fewer subsidies, stronger agricultural sector 1986–87, output of the agricultural sector has grown by more than 40 percent in constant terms. The share of farming in GDP rose from 14.2 percent in 1986–87 to 16.6 percent in 1999–2000, and growth in the farming sector has outpaced economic growth of New Zealand as a whole. The reform also prompted greater competition and lower input costs among suppliers, and brought environmental benefits through reduced waste. Although land values fell during late 1980s and early 1990s, they recovered during the later part of the decade. The share of rural population has remained constant since the abolition of subsidies. Some of the most impressive effects of subsidy removal have been the changes in agricultural productivity. Since 1986, the annual average rate of productivity growth in agriculture has reached 5.9 percent, compared with 1 percent prior to subsidy abolition. The fact that total lamb production has increased while the number of sheep has declined by 29 percent attests to the increased efficiency of the sector. However, some studies, such as Morrison Paul, Johnston, and Frengley (2000), have questioned the positive effects of the reforms on productivity. The latter, using an unbalanced panel of 32 farms between 1969 and 1991, found that agricultural reform caused changes in the composition of output—a shift out of wool and lamb and into beef and deer—but did not affect technical efficiency. On the other hand, work using aggregate data, such as Kalaitzandonakes and Bredahl (1994), has confirmed improvements in technical efficiency following the reforms. Overall, the removal of support did not have a grave effect on New Zealand’s farmers. Instead, the policy of liberalization created a more vibrant, diversified, and sustainable rural economy in New Zealand. Source: World Bank staff. http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2004/chapter3.pdf (16 Comments | Comment on this)

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