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Пишет llsnk (![[info]](http://lj.rossia.org/img/userinfo.gif){kind=small} llsnk)@ 2007-02-05 15:52:00 |
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How to Fight the Soviets
Japanese officers got their impression of the Soviet mind from a short, classified manual titled How to Fight the Soviets, which appeared in 1933 under the imprimatur of the IJA Chief of Staff, Prince Kanin. The purpose of this forty-nine-page, handwritten manual was to serve as a guide for Japanese officers in planning their operations against the Red Army. The first chapter, on which the subsequent discussions of tactics were based, analyzed the characteristics of the Soviet people and army. According to the manual, the Soviet people were submissive, docile, and prone to blind obedience. Subjected to outside pressure, however, they quickly fell victim to dispair and depression. Likewise, since the Soviet soldier shared these national characteristics, he was capable merely of following orders and showing little, if any, initiative in his dull-witted, stolid manner.48 The recent fighting at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan only demonstrated in the minds of Japanese officers the accuracy of these general observations.49
The Japanese further felt that these Soviet national characteristics, in turn, created the Red Army's greatest flaw, the inability of Soviet units to cooperate with one another in encirclements or flanking maneuvers. The manual acknowledged that the Soviet soldier could defend a front with tenacity because of his lack of imagination and initiative. An attack against the Soviet flank that threatened their supply lines would assure that the Soviet forces quickly fell into disorder. In short. this influential manual proposed taking advantage of the Soviet's racial defects in order to deliver a decisive blow that would destroy the Red Army. It seems an unlikely coincidence that such a stereotype could have developed independently of the tactical doctrine of sokusen sokketsu. Both concepts merged in How to Fight the Soviets because a lightning engagement with the Red Army followed by a decisive IJA victory would lead to the breakdown of Soviet morale.50 So while the Japanese infantryman preparing to meet his Soviet counterpart could be in high spirits, his misunderstanding and misconceptions about the Red Army were about to exact a terrible price.
Japanese officers got their impression of the Soviet mind from a short, classified manual titled How to Fight the Soviets, which appeared in 1933 under the imprimatur of the IJA Chief of Staff, Prince Kanin. The purpose of this forty-nine-page, handwritten manual was to serve as a guide for Japanese officers in planning their operations against the Red Army. The first chapter, on which the subsequent discussions of tactics were based, analyzed the characteristics of the Soviet people and army. According to the manual, the Soviet people were submissive, docile, and prone to blind obedience. Subjected to outside pressure, however, they quickly fell victim to dispair and depression. Likewise, since the Soviet soldier shared these national characteristics, he was capable merely of following orders and showing little, if any, initiative in his dull-witted, stolid manner.48 The recent fighting at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan only demonstrated in the minds of Japanese officers the accuracy of these general observations.49
The Japanese further felt that these Soviet national characteristics, in turn, created the Red Army's greatest flaw, the inability of Soviet units to cooperate with one another in encirclements or flanking maneuvers. The manual acknowledged that the Soviet soldier could defend a front with tenacity because of his lack of imagination and initiative. An attack against the Soviet flank that threatened their supply lines would assure that the Soviet forces quickly fell into disorder. In short. this influential manual proposed taking advantage of the Soviet's racial defects in order to deliver a decisive blow that would destroy the Red Army. It seems an unlikely coincidence that such a stereotype could have developed independently of the tactical doctrine of sokusen sokketsu. Both concepts merged in How to Fight the Soviets because a lightning engagement with the Red Army followed by a decisive IJA victory would lead to the breakdown of Soviet morale.50 So while the Japanese infantryman preparing to meet his Soviet counterpart could be in high spirits, his misunderstanding and misconceptions about the Red Army were about to exact a terrible price.
