Friday, December 27th, 2019

Time	Event
5:28p	Huang: Can We Build Trustable Hardware? Andrew 'bunnie' Huang has posted a detailed article on why creating trustable hardware is so difficult and describing a project he's working on to do it anyway. "While open hardware has the opportunity to empower users to innovate and embody a more correct and transparent design intent than closed hardware, at the end of the day any hardware of sufficient complexity is not practical to verify, whether open or closed. Even if we published the complete mask set for a modern billion-transistor CPU, this 'source code' is meaningless without a practical method to verify an equivalence between the mask set and the chip in your possession down to a near-atomic level without simultaneously destroying the CPU." (Comment on this)
5:29p	[$] KRSI — the other BPF security module One of the first uses of the BPF virtual machine outside of networking was to implement access-control policies for the seccomp() system call. Since then, though, the role of BPF in the security area has not changed much in the mainline kernel, even though BPF has evolved considerably from the "classic" variant still used with seccomp() to the "extended" BPF now supported by the kernel. That has not been for a lack of trying, though. The out-of-tree Landlock security module was covered here over three years ago. We also looked at the kernel runtime security instrumentation (KRSI) patch set in September. KP Singh has posted a new KRSI series, so the time seems right for a closer look. (Comment on this)
5:44p	Security updates for Friday Security updates have been issued by SUSE (dia, kernel, and libgcrypt). (Comment on this)
5:54p	Garrett: Wifi deauthentication attacks and home security Matthew Garrett works out how to avoid being recorded by "Ring" door cameras in his apartment building. "The most interesting one here is the deauthentication frame that access points can use to tell clients that they're no longer welcome. These can be sent for a variety of reasons, including resource exhaustion or authentication failure. And, by default, they're entirely unprotected. Anyone can inject such a frame into your network and cause clients to believe they're no longer authorised to use the network, at which point they'll have to go through a new authentication cycle - and while they're doing that, they're not able to send any other packets." (Comment on this)

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