Schneier on Security's Journal
[Most Recent Entries]
[Calendar View]
Monday, January 28th, 2013
Time |
Event |
6:07a |
Violence as a Contagious Disease This is fascinating:
Intuitively we understand that people surrounded by violence are more likely to be violent themselves. This isn't just some nebulous phenomenon, argue Slutkin and his colleagues, but a dynamic that can be rigorously quantified and understood.
According to their theory, exposure to violence is conceptually similar to exposure to, say, cholera or tuberculosis. Acts of violence are the germs. Instead of wracking intestines or lungs, they lodge in the brain. When people, in particular children and young adults whose brains are extremely plastic, repeatedly experience or witness violence, their neurological function is altered.
Cognitive pathways involving anger are more easily activated. Victimized people also interpret reality through perceptual filters in which violence seems normal and threats are enhanced. People in this state of mind are more likely to behave violently. Instead of through a cough, the disease spreads through fights, rapes, killings, suicides, perhaps even media, the researchers argue.
[...]
Not everybody becomes infected, of course. As with an infectious disease, circumstance is key. Social circumstance, especially individual or community isolation -- people who feel there’s no way out for them, or disconnected from social norms -- is what ultimately allows violence to spread readily, just as water sources fouled by sewage exacerbate cholera outbreaks.
At a macroscopic population level, these interactions produce geographic patterns of violence that sometimes resemble maps of disease epidemics. There are clusters, hotspots, epicenters. Isolated acts of violence are followed by others, which are followed by still more, and so on.
There are telltale incidence patterns formed as an initial wave of cases recedes, then is followed by successive waves that result from infected individuals reaching new, susceptible populations. "The epidemiology of this is very clear when you look at the math," said Slutkin. "The density maps of shootings in Kansas City or New York or Detroit look like cholera case maps from Bangladesh."
I am reminded of this paper on the effects of bystanders on escalating and de-escalating potentially violent situations. | 1:25p |
Dangerous Security Theater: Scrambling Fighter Jets This story exemplifies everything that's wrong with our see-something-say-something war on terror: a perfectly innocent person on an airplane, a random person identifying him as a terrorist threat, and a complete overreaction on the part of the authorities.
Typical overreaction, but in this case -- as in several others over the past decade -- F-15 fighter jets were scrambled to escort the airplane to the ground. Very expensive, and potentially catastrophically fatal.
This blog post make the point well:
What bothers me about this is not so much that they interrogated the wrong person -- that happens all the time, not that it's okay -- but rather the fighter jets. I think most people probably understand this, but just to make it totally clear, if they send up fighters that is not because they are bringing the first-class passengers some more of those little hot towels. It is so they can be ready to SHOOT YOU DOWN if necessary. Now, I realize the odds that would ever happen, even accidentally, are very tiny. I still question whether it's wise to put fighters next to a passenger plane at the drop of a hat, or in this case because of an anonymous tip about a sleeping passenger.
[...]
According to the Seattle Times report, though, interceptions like this are apparently much more common than I thought. Citing a NORAD spokesman, it says this has happened "thousands of times" since 9/11. In this press release NORAD says there have been "over fifteen hundred" since 9/11, most apparently involving planes that violated "temporary flight restriction" areas. Either way, while this is a small percentage of all flights, of course, it still seems like one hell of a lot of interceptions -- especially since in every single case, it has been unnecessary, and is (as NORAD admits) "at great expense to the taxpayer." |
|