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Пишет iv_g (![[info]](http://lj.rossia.org/img/userinfo.gif){kind=small} iv_g)@ 2012-02-08 15:25:00 |
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The Strategic Importance of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia
Indeed, Bahrain was the first location in the Middle East that oil was "discovered" (in the sense of drilling for it and finding it). But even Bahrain oil is complicated, and many different factors influence the role that oil is playing in current events. For one thing, it actually produces relatively little oil directly. Its only field, Awali, peaked decades ago at about 75,000 bpd and has been producing around 30,000 bpd. Cumulative production is a little over 900 million barrels.
The additional liquids production possibly comes from some natural gas liquids production (Bahrain has some non-associated gas fields), but most of the difference between the Awali and Bahrain outputs is refinery gains, as about 250,000 bpd of oil is refined at the state-owned refinery.
Bahrain is trying to squeeze more out of Awali, and has been doing some rather extensive drilling for such a small field. From the 2009 Annual Review of Bapco (the national oil company):
An aggressive development drilling programme for the 2009-2011 period is underway. A total of 104 wells are targeted in the programme, including complex directional, horizontal and reentry wells as well as conventional vertical wells.
In Bahrain Occidental has partnered with Bapco and Mubadala to form Tatweer, who are currently conducting pilot studies on the heavy oil reservoirs in the Awali field. The reservoirs have low permeability (2mD) unfractured carbonates with large volumes of heavy oil, and a trial of steam injection above the fracture gradient is being considered for 2011/2012.
When the British finally decided to get out of the Gulf, both Saudi Arabia and Iran made a claim for Bahrain. There was some talk of folding it into a new state including Qatar and what is now the United Arab Emerites, but this did not sit well with Iran.
An obstacle to creating a "superstate" was the status of Bahrain, which had been occupied by Iran at various times. The shah of Iran argued that he had a stronger claim to the island than the Al Khalifa, who had only come to Bahrain in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the shah indicated that Iran would not accept a federation of Arab states that included Bahrain.
Iranian Claims
What is evident is that the maritime and costal of Bahrain were part of Iranian territory from the beginning of Sasanian Empire until throughout of Iran was occupied by the Arabs Islamic forces and migration of Bedouins from Arabian deserts into southern Iranian territories started.
There were several territorial claims by Persia in the 20th century up until Bahrain was granted independence by Britain in 1971.
Sum of All Saudi Fears
The following map illustrates quite simply why Saudi Arabia has substantial concern over unrest in Bahrain:
Location of Bahrain relative to Saudi Arabian Oil Infrastructure. The orange outline shows the relevant maritime borders.
Quite obviously, Bahrain sits within throwing distance (as few as 25 miles) from critical Saudi oil infrastructure. Shown on the map are nearby Saudi oil fields (Ghawar, Abqaiq, Abu Safah, Qatif, and Berri), the oil export terminals (Ras Tanura, Al Juaymah), the critical oil processing facilities at Abqaiq, and the equally critical water treatment facilities of Qurayyah which enable water injection of many fields including Ghawar, Abqaiq, Berri, and Khurais. The even slight possibility that Iran could gain control over land so close to these facilities has motivated a surprising amount of largess towards Bahrain. This largess begins with the deal giving Bahrain half of the Abu Safah output (albeit under treaty), but there is more to the story. And while there are other factors besides security of the oil infrastructure which likely contribute to the largesse, it is probably true that Bahrain would not exist as an independent nation if not for it.
Let's return to the agreement which provides Bahrain's largest single source of income. As discussed earlier, Bahrain has long had multiple claims of ownership. The first disputes were over who owned the islands; later disputes were about ownership of the water around them (and the oil under that). These disputes have come and gone over years, and just a year ago, Qatar, Iran, and Bahrain signed yet another treaty once again clarifying territorial boundaries in the Gulf. But the first agreement signed by Bahrain was with Saudi Arabia, and it concerned oil. Both BAPCO and Saudi Aramco had done some exploration on the seabed of the Abu Saf-ah Shoal, shallow waters located 65 miles NW of Bahrain but only 30 miles off the Saudi coast (see map), as early as 1949. In 1958, they came to an agreement: the disputed area was on the Saudi side of the border, but they would assign to Bahrain half of the oil revenue in perpetuity.
The timeline below shows how this agreement has resonated through the years.
1949-1950: Bapco and Saudi Aramco explore on the seabed of the Abu Saf-ah Shoal.
1958: Maritime border agreement gives oil rights to Saudi Arabia in exchange for share of revenues
1963: Abu Safah field discovered
1966: Abu Safah production started
1972: Revenue sharing agreement gives 50% to Bahrain
1986: Abu Safah field mothballed due to collapsed oil prices
1987-1992: Saudi Arabia gives Bahrain 70,000 bpd from its remaining production
1992: Abu Safah field restarted. Bahrain receives 50% of revenue
1996-2004: Saudi Arabia gives Bahrain 100% of Abu Safah revenue.
2004: Abu Safah reworked along with Qatif field. Abu Safah production at 300,000 bpd.
2004: Bahrain receives 50% of Abu Safah revenue (150 kbpd of 300 kbpd total)
Another big source of revenue for Bahrain and the government is the al-Bahrain Refinery, which process about 250,000 bpd of crude and exports refined products to Asia and elsewhere. It does not use crude from Abu Safah (although this has been considered). Rather, Arabian Light crude is imported via pipelines from Saudi Arabia to supplement the amount produced at Awali. But as others have noted, the Abu Safah oil is the dominant fraction of the overall oil revenue for Bahrain. Even an oversized refining margin on 225 kbpd of crude will be much smaller in magnitude than the full take from 150 kbpd.
One important Saudi connection to the economy of Bahrain is the causeway connecting it with the mainland, and the millions of Saudis who drive over to enjoy a few days in a less restrictive society. What happens in Manama stays in Manama. According to the Wall Street Journal, this economic exchange accounts for a tenth of Bahrain's GDP.
About ten years ago, a border dispute between Bahrain and Qatar involving the Hawar Islands (located near the coast of Qatar) was settled in the World Court. Bahrain wanted the islands and the potential oil under the gulf waters nearby, and they got them.
http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Mid
Indeed, Bahrain was the first location in the Middle East that oil was "discovered" (in the sense of drilling for it and finding it). But even Bahrain oil is complicated, and many different factors influence the role that oil is playing in current events. For one thing, it actually produces relatively little oil directly. Its only field, Awali, peaked decades ago at about 75,000 bpd and has been producing around 30,000 bpd. Cumulative production is a little over 900 million barrels.
The additional liquids production possibly comes from some natural gas liquids production (Bahrain has some non-associated gas fields), but most of the difference between the Awali and Bahrain outputs is refinery gains, as about 250,000 bpd of oil is refined at the state-owned refinery.
Bahrain is trying to squeeze more out of Awali, and has been doing some rather extensive drilling for such a small field. From the 2009 Annual Review of Bapco (the national oil company):
An aggressive development drilling programme for the 2009-2011 period is underway. A total of 104 wells are targeted in the programme, including complex directional, horizontal and reentry wells as well as conventional vertical wells.
In Bahrain Occidental has partnered with Bapco and Mubadala to form Tatweer, who are currently conducting pilot studies on the heavy oil reservoirs in the Awali field. The reservoirs have low permeability (2mD) unfractured carbonates with large volumes of heavy oil, and a trial of steam injection above the fracture gradient is being considered for 2011/2012.
When the British finally decided to get out of the Gulf, both Saudi Arabia and Iran made a claim for Bahrain. There was some talk of folding it into a new state including Qatar and what is now the United Arab Emerites, but this did not sit well with Iran.
An obstacle to creating a "superstate" was the status of Bahrain, which had been occupied by Iran at various times. The shah of Iran argued that he had a stronger claim to the island than the Al Khalifa, who had only come to Bahrain in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the shah indicated that Iran would not accept a federation of Arab states that included Bahrain.
Iranian Claims
What is evident is that the maritime and costal of Bahrain were part of Iranian territory from the beginning of Sasanian Empire until throughout of Iran was occupied by the Arabs Islamic forces and migration of Bedouins from Arabian deserts into southern Iranian territories started.
There were several territorial claims by Persia in the 20th century up until Bahrain was granted independence by Britain in 1971.
Sum of All Saudi Fears
The following map illustrates quite simply why Saudi Arabia has substantial concern over unrest in Bahrain:
Location of Bahrain relative to Saudi Arabian Oil Infrastructure. The orange outline shows the relevant maritime borders.
Quite obviously, Bahrain sits within throwing distance (as few as 25 miles) from critical Saudi oil infrastructure. Shown on the map are nearby Saudi oil fields (Ghawar, Abqaiq, Abu Safah, Qatif, and Berri), the oil export terminals (Ras Tanura, Al Juaymah), the critical oil processing facilities at Abqaiq, and the equally critical water treatment facilities of Qurayyah which enable water injection of many fields including Ghawar, Abqaiq, Berri, and Khurais. The even slight possibility that Iran could gain control over land so close to these facilities has motivated a surprising amount of largess towards Bahrain. This largess begins with the deal giving Bahrain half of the Abu Safah output (albeit under treaty), but there is more to the story. And while there are other factors besides security of the oil infrastructure which likely contribute to the largesse, it is probably true that Bahrain would not exist as an independent nation if not for it.
Let's return to the agreement which provides Bahrain's largest single source of income. As discussed earlier, Bahrain has long had multiple claims of ownership. The first disputes were over who owned the islands; later disputes were about ownership of the water around them (and the oil under that). These disputes have come and gone over years, and just a year ago, Qatar, Iran, and Bahrain signed yet another treaty once again clarifying territorial boundaries in the Gulf. But the first agreement signed by Bahrain was with Saudi Arabia, and it concerned oil. Both BAPCO and Saudi Aramco had done some exploration on the seabed of the Abu Saf-ah Shoal, shallow waters located 65 miles NW of Bahrain but only 30 miles off the Saudi coast (see map), as early as 1949. In 1958, they came to an agreement: the disputed area was on the Saudi side of the border, but they would assign to Bahrain half of the oil revenue in perpetuity.
The timeline below shows how this agreement has resonated through the years.
1949-1950: Bapco and Saudi Aramco explore on the seabed of the Abu Saf-ah Shoal.
1958: Maritime border agreement gives oil rights to Saudi Arabia in exchange for share of revenues
1963: Abu Safah field discovered
1966: Abu Safah production started
1972: Revenue sharing agreement gives 50% to Bahrain
1986: Abu Safah field mothballed due to collapsed oil prices
1987-1992: Saudi Arabia gives Bahrain 70,000 bpd from its remaining production
1992: Abu Safah field restarted. Bahrain receives 50% of revenue
1996-2004: Saudi Arabia gives Bahrain 100% of Abu Safah revenue.
2004: Abu Safah reworked along with Qatif field. Abu Safah production at 300,000 bpd.
2004: Bahrain receives 50% of Abu Safah revenue (150 kbpd of 300 kbpd total)
Another big source of revenue for Bahrain and the government is the al-Bahrain Refinery, which process about 250,000 bpd of crude and exports refined products to Asia and elsewhere. It does not use crude from Abu Safah (although this has been considered). Rather, Arabian Light crude is imported via pipelines from Saudi Arabia to supplement the amount produced at Awali. But as others have noted, the Abu Safah oil is the dominant fraction of the overall oil revenue for Bahrain. Even an oversized refining margin on 225 kbpd of crude will be much smaller in magnitude than the full take from 150 kbpd.
One important Saudi connection to the economy of Bahrain is the causeway connecting it with the mainland, and the millions of Saudis who drive over to enjoy a few days in a less restrictive society. What happens in Manama stays in Manama. According to the Wall Street Journal, this economic exchange accounts for a tenth of Bahrain's GDP.
About ten years ago, a border dispute between Bahrain and Qatar involving the Hawar Islands (located near the coast of Qatar) was settled in the World Court. Bahrain wanted the islands and the potential oil under the gulf waters nearby, and they got them.
http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Mid
