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[Aug. 3rd, 2003|02:10 pm] |
Fathers discover and explore the land.
Sons develop and harvest.
Grandsons exploit and squander. |
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| Quotes: Karl R.Popper on science from Conj and Refutations |
[Aug. 3rd, 2003|02:42 pm] |
What is important about a theory is its explanatory power, and whether it stands up to criticism and to tests. The question of its origin, of how it is arrived at - whether by an 'inductive procedure', as some say, or by an act of intution has little to do with its scientific character.
As to the starting point of science, I do not say that science starts from intuitions but that it starts from problems; that these problems arise in our attempts to understand the world as we know it - the world of our 'experience'( where 'experience' consists largely of expectations or thories and partly also of observational knowledge - although I happen to believe that there does not exist anything like pure observational knowledge, untainted by expectations or thories). |
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| почитаешь философию - начнешь философствовать. (народная примета) |
[Aug. 3rd, 2003|03:36 pm] |
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эмиграция - процесс переоценки ценностей между двумя глотками кока-колы: первым и последним. |
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| K.R. Popper "Conjectures and Refutations" |
[Aug. 3rd, 2003|05:37 pm] |
Popper's correction of Kant's solution:
"Our intellect does not draw its laws from nature, but tries - with varying degrees of success - to impose upon nature laws which it freely invents."
So, since "To utter a word and mean nothing by it is unworthy of a philosopher" (Berkeley, De Motu, 1721), I wonder where did Popper get "freely". Our brain processes are shaped by bio- and info- evolution, so to imply that we can develop ideas independently from the environment is to go a bit too far.
He further writes:
"The modification of Kant's solution which I propose, in accordance with the Einsteinian revolution, frees us from this compulsion ( to impose an explanation once and for all). In this way, thories are seen to be the free(K.R.P.) creations of our own minds, the result of an almost poetic intuition, of an attmpt to understand intuitively the laws of nature. But we no longer try to force our creations upon nature. On the contrary, we question nature, as Kant taught us to do; and we try to elicit from here negative answers concerning the truth of our theories: we do not try to prove or to verify them, but we test them by trying to disprove or falsify them, to refute them.
Now the question becomes: where does the intuition come from? One could say it (the question) is irrelevant, since the origin of a theory is not that important. But if we fail to consider it, we may never find out what intuition is and how to form better intuitions. |
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| K.R.Popper on the problem of irrefutable phil. theories |
[Aug. 3rd, 2003|06:15 pm] |
In other words every rational(KRP) theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is rational in so far as it tries to solve certain problems(KRP). A theory is acomprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a given problem-situation, and it can be rationally discussed only by discussing this relation.
...For we can now ask questions such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical theories needed for solving other problems? |
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| K.R. Popper on problems. Conjectures and Refutations. |
[Aug. 3rd, 2003|11:19 pm] |
Admittedly, our expectations, and thus our theories, may precede, historically, even our problems. Yet science starts only wieth problems.(KRP) Problemns crop up especially when we are disappointed in our expectations, or when our theories involve us in difficulties, in contradictions; and these may arise either within a theory, or between two different theories, or as the result of a clashh between our theories and our observations. Moreover, it is only through a problem that we become conscious of holding a theory. It is the problem which challenges us to learn; to advance our knowledge; to experiment; and to observe.
Thus we may say that the most lasting contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge that a theory can make are the new problems which it raises, so that we are led back to the view of science and of th e growth of knowledge as starting from, and always ending with, problems - problems of an evr increasing depth, and an ever increasing fertility in suggesting new problems. |
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