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5 Some Elements of Naive Geography
The mere identification of a comprehensive set of elements of Naive Geography comprises a major research task, and its completion would provide a big step towards the successful manifestation of Naive Geography. As a starting point, we present an ad hoc collection of elements that would contribute to a Naive Geography. The list is by no means exhaustive, and some of the following may turn out to be false, or at least uncommon and/or limited to specific cultures, primarily those of the authors. We present these elements to give the reader a flavor of what we intend should be included in Naive Geography.
Manipulable objects on a table-top are essentially three-dimensional. Even a sheet of paper has a thickness. Furthermore, in everyday-object (manipulable) space, the three dimensions are all about equal. Objects are easily rotated about any axis, or obliquely. When an object is moved, we expect its properties, spatial and non-spatial, to remain unchanged.
Geographic space under Naive Geography is, in contrast, essentially two-dimensional. There is considerable evidence that the horizontal and vertical dimensions are decoupled in geographic space. For example, people often grossly over-estimate the steepness of slopes, and the depths of canyons compared to their widths. So, instead of parsing a three-dimensional space into three independent one-dimensional axes, geographic space seems to be interpreted as a horizontal, two-dimensional space, with the third dimension reduced more to an attribute (of position) rather than an equal dimension. This is very much like the 2 1/2-D representations used in computational vision (Marr 1982). That GISs have succeeded in the marketplace with little or no capabilities to do three-dimensional analysis is testimony to the nature of geographic space. A two-dimensional system for CAD (computer-aided design) would not likely be successful.
5.2 The Earth is Flat
This is a different point than the one about two-dimensionality. In most of our large-scale reasoning tasks, this is a common simplification. It is not a discussion as to whether it is admissible, or not. People do it. When traveling from Boston to New York, one disregards the Earth's curvature. This is independent of the mode of transportation. Trans-Atlantic air travelers often ask why tile flight path goes all the way up over Greenland, rather than going straight across—the great circle, shortest path between two points across the surface of a sphere, is not part of common-sense knowledge for most people.
5.3 Maps are More Real Than Experience
Perhaps this point should be, "Maps are more faithful to the reality of geographic space than are our direct experiences of such spaces." Many times, we hear statements like, "When I get home, I want to look at the route on a map, to see where I went." This seems to be based on a naive assumption that the truth about where one is in geographic space is better represented by a map- based, map-like, or configurational view of geographic space, than it is by our memories of our experiences with that space from within.
5.4 Geographic Entities are Ontologically Different from Enlarged Table-Top Objects
As geographic space differs from table-top space, so are the properties and the behavior of many entities in geographic space different from those on a table top. The issue is not just mere size. In his paper Ontology of Liquids, Hayes (1985b) gave an excellent example with a detailed discussion of how the ontology of lakes is different from that of many other objects composed of liquids. He showed how a phenomenon/entity in geographic space has an ontology that is not simply an enlarged version of the table-top manipulable world.
5.5 Geographic Space and Time are Tightly Coupled
The linkage between space and time is an aspect of Naive Geography that deserves special attention. The term geographic space and time is understood such that geographic distributes over space and time – formalists would tend to write geographic (space and time). As there is geographic space, we want to argue that there is geographic time, i.e., time that is inherently linked to geographic concepts (Egenhofer and Golledge 1994). We select one of several examples to underline this claim:
Many cultures have pre-metric units of area that are based on effort over time (Kula 1983). The English acre (Jones 1963; Zupko 1968; 1977), the German morgen (Kennelly 1928), and the French arpent (Zupko 1978) all are based on the amount of land that a person with a yoke of oxen or a horse can plow in one day or one morning. There have been similar measures for distance, such as how far a person can walk in an hour, or how far an army can march in a day. We know of no such "effort-based" units of measure for manipulable (table-top) space.
5.6 Geographic Information is Frequently Incomplete
Another setting for geographic reasoning is given by the constraint that reasoning in geographic space must typically deal with incomplete information. Nevertheless, people can draw sufficiently precise conclusions, e.g., by completing information intelligently or by applying default rules, frequently based on common sense. A number of cognitive studies have provided evidence that people may employ hierarchically organized schemes to reason in geographic space and to compensate for missing information (Hirtie and Jonides 1985; McNamara et al. 1989).
5.7 People use Multiple Conceptualizations of Geographic Space
When thinking about geographic space, people typically employ several different concepts, and change between them frequently. Such conceptualizations of space may reflect the differences between perceptual and cognitive space (Couclelis and Gale 1986), or may be based on different geometrical properties, such as continuous vs. discrete (Egenhofer and Herring 1991; Frank and Mark l'991). The dependency on scale, or difference in the types of operations people would typically employ, has been raised as another motivation for distinguishing different types of spaces (Zubin 1989).
5.8 Geographic Space has Multiple Levels of Detail
This aspect of representing geographic space is orthogonal to multiple conceptualizations of geographic space. A conceptualization of geographic space may have several levels of granularity, each of which will be appropriate for problem solving at different levels of detail. In cartographic applications, this aspect has been considered to be part of scale (Buttenfield 1989). The naive view of geographic space implies that processing a query against a more detailed representation would not provide a more precise query result.
5.9 Boundaries are Sometimes Entities, Sometimes Not
The fact that Naive Geography models geographic space as it is perceived by people, is strongly reflected in the way boundaries are represented. There is no uniform view of what a boundary is and how it is established – even if one could agree on a model for the physical entities. Such simple configurations as national boundaries may have diverse interpretations, even if the countries involved agree over the extent of their territories. Conventionally, political subdivisions are modeled as a partition of space in which a boundary separates one nation's land from its neighbor. Each of the neighbors may actually have a different perspective, namely that the boundary belongs to their country. As such, the boundary between two neighboring countries may be considered a pair of boundaries. Smith (1994) argues, from a philosophical point of view, that there may be geographic situations in which the boundary between two adjacent areas is even asymmetric. As examples he cites situations in which one country did not recognize the existence of a national boundary with its neighbor, while the other country considered it a valid boundary. Political subdivisions are certainly not the only cases in which such multiple views of boundaries may occur. The same case could be made for land parcels and the question as to who owns the boundary between two adjacent parcels.
5.10 Topology Matters, Metric Refines
In geographic space, topology is considered to be first-class information , whereas metric properties, such as distances and shapes, are used as refinements that i e frequently less exactly captured. There is ample evidence that people organize geographic space such that topological information is retained fairly precisely, capturing such relationships as inclusion, coincidence, and left/right (Lynch 1960; Stevens and Coupe 1978; Riesbeck 1980).
5.11 People have Biases Toward North-South and East-West Directions
People's mental maps of directions and distances are frequently quite gross simplifications, with particular preferences for alignments in North-South and East-West directions. Despite exposure to maps and satellite images, we often ignore geographic reality. For instance, at a global scale, South America often is considered to be due south of North America. Likewise, most people misjudge latitudes when trying to compare cities in North America and Europe (Tversky 1981). While such misconceptions are similar to those found by Stevens and Coupe (1978), they cannot be explained with a hierarchical conceptualization of geographic space. A potential source for some of these errors are climate comparisons, and the equation (for the Northern hemisphere) that colder means further North, and warmer equates to further South, may indicate that factors other than geographic location may influence estimations of directions.
Biases toward strict cardinal directions appear also in judgments about coastlines-the U.S. East coast is frequently believed to be due North-South (Mark 1992b). Such misconceptions may have surprising consequences when people interact with information systems. For example, most people requesting the satellite image South of the State of Maine from an image archive, would expect to receive an image that covers parts of New Hampshire and Massachusetts (Frank 1992). They would be puzzled to get nothing but water!
People tend to have similar biases towards North-South directions and right angles in navigation, where they may be irritated by slight deviations from the norm and consequently perform poorly in wayfinding.
5.12 Distances are Asymmetric
Euclidean geometry includes the axiom that a distance from point A to point В is equal to the distance from В to A. In naive geographic space, this premise is frequently violated. Distances are not only thought of as lengths of paths on the Earth's surface, but frequently seen as a measure for how long it takes to get from one place to another (Kosslyn et al. 1978). The shortest path may have multiple interpretations, e.g., in terms' of distance, time, fuel consumption, or toll. Even if the same path, ш opposite directions, is chosen between two points, the distance as people perceive it may not be the same (Golledge et al. 1969): terrain may influence how fast one can travel or traffic during rush hours may slow down travel in one direction.
While distance applies as a measure between positions in geographic space, it extends to abstract concepts where it captures conceptual closeness. For example, among water bodies, a pond is conceptually closer to a lake than to the sea, because one can find more conceptual differences between a pond and the ocean than between a pond and a lake. The shorter the distance is, the more similar the instances are. Again, such distances among concepts are frequently asymmetric, implying that the induced similarity is asymmetric as well (Papadias 1995), i.e., if A is similar to B, then В is not necessarily similar to A.
5.13 Distance Inferences are Local, Not Global
Geographic distances are thought of as local, i.e., covering the neighborhood between the two points of interest, without involving locations remote to both objects. Common coordinate systems, however, have their origins at the equator, and distance differences are calculated as differences of lengths from the equator and from Greenwich. How far it is from Bangor, Maine to Orono, Maine is based on how distant Bangor and Orono are from the equator, and how remote Bangor and Orono are from Greenwich, U.K. (Goodchild 1994). In a similar way, any distinction about North, South, East, and West is related on tile reference frame's (remote) origin. Despite the convenience of such coordinate calculations, alternative spatial reference systems are needed in support of Naive Geography. Such reference systems should pay attention to neighborhood relations, as demonstrated in measurement-based systems (Buyong et al. 1991), or use coordinate-based calculations as a last resort of inference, as supported by deductive geographic databases (Sharma et al. 1994).
5.14 Distances Don't Add Up Easily
Reasoning about distances along networks in geographic space underlies formalisms that differ considerably from standard calculus. Usually, one adds up lengths of segments along a path, irrespective of their values, to obtain the length of the entire path. This method provides unreasonable results in cases where the values to be added differ by large amounts. For instance, the distance between the airports in Bangor, Maine and Santa Barbara, California is approximately 5,000 kilometers. When computing the travel distance from the University of Maine to UC Santa Barbara, it would make little sense to add the relatively short legs between the campuses and the respective airports – 10 kilometers and 1.5 kilometers – to the overall distance and claim that it took 5,011.5 kilometers to get from one campus to the other.
6 Conclusions
This paper described tile notion and concepts of Naive Geography. Naive Geography establishes the link between how people think about geographic space and how to develop formal models of such reasoning that can be incorporated into software systems. Such intelligent GISs – one or two generations down the road – would be intuitive to use and would provide powerful reasoning capabilities and some limited methods to make predications of human behavior. Like Patrick Hayes in his Naive Physics Manifesto, we consider our framework as a start of a discussion, to be revised in the future.
Common-sense reasoning is difficult, and if there are formalizations that appear to be common-sensical, then they are excellent results. Unfortunately, our scientific communities frequently consider such formalizations as "too simplistic'' – because everyone understands them, and science should have some complexity to be considered science. We disagree with this attitude at the level of common-sense reasoning. If it is simple and solves the problem, then it is good.
7 Acknowledgments
Andrew Frank, Pat Hayes, and Barry Smith deserve special credit for discussions and comments that helped us shape the concepts of Naive Geography. We are also grateful to many others- impossible to be named explicitly – who have contributed as well.
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