Держи вот тебе ответ робота, подробненько, прямо жёстко по теме с первого же промпта, пример идеален:

You said:
In the context of Hume's principle and fork, can it be valid to derive a descriptive statement from a normative one?

ChatGPT said:
In the context of Hume's Fork and Hume's Principle, it is generally not valid to derive a descriptive statement from a normative one, just as it is not valid (in Hume's view) to derive a normative statement from a descriptive one without justification.

Let’s unpack this carefully.

???? Hume’s Fork
David Hume distinguishes between two types of knowledge:

Relations of ideas – a priori, necessary, and analytic truths (e.g., math, logic).

Matters of fact – a posteriori, contingent, and empirical truths (e.g., scientific observations).

In his epistemology, Hume suggests that all meaningful knowledge falls into one of these categories. Anything outside this framework is either nonsensical or needs strong justification.

???? The Is-Ought Problem
This is more relevant to your question.

Hume famously wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature that:

“... the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.”

This is the is-ought gap: Hume warns that we cannot validly derive normative (ought) conclusions from purely descriptive (is) premises without some bridge principle that justifies the move.

???? Can We Go the Other Way? Deriving Is from Ought?
You're asking the reverse: can one derive a descriptive ("is") claim from a normative ("ought") one?

Short answer: According to Humean reasoning, no — at least not without an additional empirical or factual premise.

Why?

Normative claims are prescriptive — they tell us how things should be.

Descriptive claims are descriptive — they tell us how things are.

Moving from an "ought" to an "is" risks smuggling in unjustified assumptions about reality based on moral or normative ideals — a form of the naturalistic fallacy in reverse.

???? Example
Suppose someone says:

Normative: "People ought to care for the environment."

Can we then conclude:

Descriptive: "People do care for the environment"?

No — the normative claim does not guarantee the descriptive one. People ought to, but they may not in fact do so.

???? Exceptions or Clarifications?
In some rhetorical or ideological contexts (e.g., propaganda, ideological bias), people do derive is from ought — but these are not logically valid inferences; they reflect psychological or political motives, not sound reasoning.

Some modern philosophers (e.g., constructivists) argue that certain kinds of moral or normative facts can, under specific frameworks, play a role in justifying empirical claims — but this departs from traditional Humean epistemology

Все так.

>just as it is not valid (in Hume's view) ... without justification
>we cannot validly ... without some bridge principle that justifies the move
>at least not without an additional empirical or factual premise

В этом вся суть. А тот клован просто смотрит на утверждения игнорируя контекст и думает будто происходят переходы между дескриптивным и нормативным напрямую без каких-либо других соображений.