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| July 5th, 2023 | ||||||||||
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| 06:40 pm [Link] |     По поводу "Одинадцатого пакета санкций ЕС против России". Говорят что эти санкции уже мало чем могут навредить конкретно России и я в это верю. Однако, эти санкции окончательно хоронят ВТО. Помните, был какой buzzword в конце девяностых - начале нулевых? Волшебный мир свободной торговли, присоединение к которому гарантирует экономическое процветание, внешние рынки и справедливые цены. Под лозунгом "выполнения требований ВТО" в свое время ликвидировали советское авторское право, заменив его на импортированный у англосаксов копирайт, придушили швейную промышленность и еще много что, за давностью лет не припомню. И практически сразу же оказалось, что членство в ВТО кругом обязывает слабые и зависимые страны (РНоссию в том числе) - но ни к чему не обязывает хозяев мировой империалистической системы. Но до поры до времени это были, гм, точечные исключения из общего принципа свободной торговли, а сам принцип хоть и урезанный, сохранялся. Типа, всем дадим, а вот специально этим, нехорошим людям, не дадим. Но "11й пакет санкций" отличается тем, что он отменяет принцип свободы торговли не в отношении конкретной, индивидуально поименованной страны, а практически в отношении всего остального мира. Ну формально, против стран, чья политическая линия отличается от ЕСовской, но для большинства стран это же даже чисто технически невозможно - следовать политике ЕС не будучи в ЕС. Мы возвращаемся в эпоху неограниченного протекционизма. (x-post) | |||||||||
| Comments | ||||||||||
We conclude that when applied to a large, resource-rich, technically proficient economy, after a period of shock and adjustments, sanctions are isomorphic to a strict policy of trade protection, industrial policy, and capital controls. These are policies that the Russian government could not plausibly have implemented, even in 2022, on its own initiative. Prominent voices within Russia, including from leading independent institutions, namely the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Free Economic Society, have for decades advocated a mixed economic model, with a strong focus on reindustrialization led by national firms and guided by the state. Their success in persuading the government to follow this path was, at best, episodic. The oligarchs, who were strongly Western-oriented, maintaining residences and investments abroad on a large scale, stood for openness and integration. So did important academic institutions and international forums. To break the grip of non-Russian actors on Russian economic life would, therefore, have required extra-legal measures reminiscent of a mafia state, incompatible with a commitment to orderly and lawful markets and business practices inside Russia – matters on which gains since the 1990s have been substantial and hard-won, if not complete. It would have required imposing tariffs, quotas, limitations on foreign ownership, even expulsions of successful and honest enterprises working on Russian soil. Internal opposition would have been strong. The short-run effect on living standards would have undermined the legitimacy of the regime. The condemnation from the West would have been extremely, and justifiably, harsh. Thus, had the sanctions not been imposed, it is difficult to see how the opportunities now open to Russian companies and entrepreneurs could have come about. Politically, administratively, legally, ideologically, even in early 2022 it would have been extremely difficult for the Russian government to initiate comparable measures, such as tariffs, quotas, and expulsions, given the unbroken grip of freemarket economics on Russian policymakers, the influence of the oligarchs, and the purportedly limited nature of the “special military operation.” In this respect, despite the shock and the costs, the sanctions imposed on the Russian economy were, evidently, in the nature of a gift. Meanwhile, the forced-draft nature of high-volume military production necessarily leads to rapid turnover of underlying machinery and advancing technologies, as well as the training of a new echelon of technical personnel. Though some techniques remain to be mastered, Russia is not short of any underlying ingredients – food, fuel, materials, scientific and engineering talent. Whether its economic leadership is of a caliber to use these resources effectively is an open question, but so far, the contrary evidence is not compelling. And, one has to ask, compared with whom? https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp204 | ||||||||||