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Пишет Misha Verbitsky ([info]tiphareth)
@ 2019-01-28 21:44:00

Previous Entry  Add to memories!  Tell a Friend!  Next Entry
Настроение: sick
Музыка:Crystal Castles - III
Entry tags:.ve, anti-russia, politics

'being rich is bad'
В Венесуэле все как в сраной, коррупция, непотизм,
даже нездоровое пристрастие к часам за полмиллиона,
что у гундяева, что у мадуровских прихвостней

не удивлюсь, если у Мадуро после революции
найдут золотой корнеплод маниоки или початок маиса

и тоже спиздят


Being the ex-President's daughter pays off: Hugo Chavez's
ambassador daughter is Venezuela's richest woman

Diario las Americas claims that Maria Gabriela Chavez,
35, has $4.2billion in assets held in American and
Andorran banks

Hugo Chavez famously declared 'being rich is bad' and
during his lifetime railed against the wealthy for
being lazy and gluttonous

Efforts to determine Chavez's wealth have been made
before, without much luck



(Читать комментарии) - (Добавить комментарий)

2019-02-01 11:09 (ссылка)
Thus, once Cardoso was in power, the question of dependency and development was turned on its head. As President, Cardoso sought explicitly to make the Brazilian economy as dependent as possible on the multinationals and financial institutions of the core in order to develop the country. But in doing so, he invited multiple contradictions, which as a theoretician he should have foreseen could not but undermine his whole project. The first of these was inexorable rise in Brazil’s trade deficit. Imports surged when protectionist barriers were further dropped in 1994. As Table 1 indicates, Brazilian trade surpluses—still running at $10–15 billion a year in the early nineties—were transformed into substantial deficits, rising to some $8.3 billion by 1997. This deterioration was a direct product of the Plano Real. For while a pegged exchange rate can fight inflation in the short run, it invites disaster in the long run, by undercutting what is already the weak link in the periphery—international competition in manufactures. If an overvalued currency is bane enough for the US or Japan, it spells little short of ruin for Brazil or Argentina. Once the exchange rate is forced up, as sooner or later the peg insures it will be, imports automatically become more competitive, and exports less so. Thus from 1995, when the US was forced to revert to a high dollar, the real could not help but follow it up. The result was to devastate the Brazilian trade balance. In the early 1990s, with the dollar and the cruzeiro low, exports had increased by 50 per cent. But from 1995 to 1999, they barely rose at all.

The combination of a widening trade deficit, and the need to build up foreign reserves to protect the overvalued currency against speculative attacks, required the support of massive inflows of foreign capital. But these in turn led to a dramatic increase in the current-account deficit, which of course included interest payments, repatriation of profits and dividends of the very capital needed to shore up the real. Thus, as Table 1 illustrates, the deficit on the current account soared from $1.7 billion in 1994, when it was 0.3 per cent of GDP, to $33.4 billion in 1998, by which time it was 4.25 per cent of GDP, and required $8.9 billion of Brazil’s reserves to cover the gap between it and net inflows of capital. In 1999, after the collapse of the currency, the deficit hit $25.3 billion, or 4.79 per cent of GDP, the highest level since 1982 when the foreign-debt crisis and the ‘lost decade’ began. In 2000, the deficit was still running at 4.15 per cent of GDP, rising to 4.61 per cent in 2001—rates much higher than in Argentina (3.1 and 1.6 per cent), Chile (1.3 and 1.5 per cent), and Mexico (3.1 and 2.8 per cent).

It had become obvious, in other words, that the more inflows of foreign capital were required to finance the deficits generated by the Plano Real, the larger the deficits themselves became, since foreign capital could not but aggravate the negative balances it financed. The result was ever greater requirements for new inflows, inaugurating another cycle of foreign indebtedness to meet the country’s external financial obligations. Table 1 shows the enormous transfer of resources in the form of interest, amortization, repatriation of profits and dividends that began in 1995, and saw Brazil’s foreign debt increase from $148.2 billion in 1994 to $241.6 billion in 1998—a $100 billion addition during Cardoso’s first term. Of this, $145 billion was owed by a private sector encouraged by the government to borrow abroad, as domestic interest rates remained high in order to increase international reserves and defend the real. If we add the total foreign debt to the stock of FDI, Brazil’s external liabilities today are an incredible $400 billion.

Such an extreme dependence on foreign capital—the current-account deficit and amortization of the debt require more than $50 billion a year—inevitably made the Brazilian economy highly vulnerable to international shocks. For conditions on the world-capital market are obviously determined by the players who do most of the business there, and these are located in the core. Brazil’s access to overseas funding ultimately depended on the demand and supply of capital in the North and, in particular, on the cost of borrowing they set. Movements on financial markets in the centre are so huge that developments in the periphery are dwarfed by them. In practice, this meant that the Brazilian economy was at the mercy of international developments triggered by the opportunities or dangers facing core investors.

The result was a series of ever-worsening domestic crises, following the same inexorable trajectory—flight of foreign capital from Brazil; imposition of super-high interest rates and tougher fiscal austerity to attract it back; collapse of domestic investment and consumer demand, leading to recession; rising unemployment, greater poverty and worsening income distribution. The outcome was to bring about a more or less continuous fall in the growth of domestic demand, to complement the stagnation of overseas demand for the country’s exports. The excruciating pressures to which the Brazilian economy was subjected by its deepening ensnarement in the debt trap ultimately became impossible to endure, and the Plano Real collapsed as Brazil’s fundamental incapacity to determine its access to world capital-markets, no matter what it did, became clear.

Today, as in 1999, establishment analysts blame the present crisis on domestic political constraints—uncertainty as to whether Cardoso can shoe in his lacklustre successor José Serra in the October elections. But its roots lie much deeper, in the fundamental strategy of dependent development adopted during Cardoso’s double presidency. In 1998 and early 1999, international financial markets understood this very well and fled. They were aware of the extreme fragility of Brazil’s financial situation, since the stratospheric interest rates needed to prop up the currency could only lead to a dramatic rise in the servicing costs of the domestic public debt. Investors thus had every reason to fear that the government might be unable to keep up interest payments and be forced to ‘restructure’ (ie: default on) its domestic debt, with knock-on effects on its dollar-denominated debt. Their apprehensions persist today. Whoever wins the election in October 2002 will inherit a grave financial crisis, the fruit of eight years of Cardoso’s ultra-neoliberal mismanagement of the economy.

Notwithstanding the evidence, neoliberal ideologues continue to maintain that the origin of the deficit is fiscal, and Cardoso has clung to the Washington Consensus’s first commandment: fiscal discipline, ‘which typically implies a primary surplus of several percentages of GDP’ [19] —intended, of course, to offset the impact of interest payments on the public deficit and restore the confidence of foreign and domestic investors in the ability of the government to honour its financial obligations. From the beginning, the Plano Real’s ‘other’ anchor was designed to be fiscal: a commitment to slash public expenditures and raise revenues, where necessary by major constitutional amendments—reforms of the civil service and pension systems to cut personnel and retirement benefits, and privatization of strategic state enterprises in the infrastructure and service sectors. Cardoso was able to mobilize Congress to restore creditors’ confidence with these austerity packages after the speculative attacks on the real. But it was only after the collapse of the currency, when the IMF took control of economic policy-making as a condition for the 1998 bail out, that large primary surpluses began to be generated above and beyond IMF targets, through indiscriminate tax increases and cuts in essential public investment, legitimated by a Law of Fiscal Responsibility (May 2000). Taxation jumped from 28 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 34 per cent in 2001, the highest level in Latin America—comparative figures for Argentina are 22–24 per cent, and for Mexico 14–16 per cent.

How far has this denationalization been compensated by a productive modernization of the Brazilian economy? The import-intensive service sector offers one answer. In the late nineties this was the principal magnet for foreign capital—its share of total FDI increasing from 43.4 per cent ($18.4 billion) in 1995 to 76.6 per cent between 1996 and February 2002, or $97.3 billion of the $127 billion invested in Brazil in these years. The typical upshot of the deregulation and privatization of electricity and telecommunications, and the unleashing of a torrent of acquisitions and mergers, was abandonment of local research and development for intra-company technological imports. The bill for capital goods from abroad jumped from $7.5 billion in 1994 to $14.8 billion in 2001, and for intermediate goods from $15.6 to $27.3 billion for the same years. Since Telebras was privatized in 1998, multinationals have been importing 97 per cent of the components required to upgrade Brazil’s antiquated phone system, as the government, to cajole the new owners, backed down from its initial demand that they utilize at least 35 per cent of national products. The price-tag for electronic components alone—especially chips—reached $5 billion in 2000. As one economist has remarked: ‘While the consumption pattern of information technology in the developed countries was diffused in Brazil in the nineties, there was an undeniable regression in production.’ [27]

The strategy of foreign corporations in Brazil has been perfectly rational; however, it has exposed the error of relying on multinationals to perform the role of leading agents of national development. ECLAC economist Michael Mortimore’s case study of FDI in Brazil’s service sector shows that the major goal of multinationals is usually to gain access to the national market, not to maximize export, let alone employment, and is achieved primarily by purchasing existing assets, not creating new ones. Assessing attempts by Latin American governments to convert FDI into an engine of growth, he concludes: ‘While the objectives of corporate strategies were for the most part met, the growth and development goals of the host countries were not.’ Rubens Ricupero, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, echoes him: ‘the commercial objectives of TNCs and the development objectives of host economies do not necessarily coincide’. [28]

In the case of the automotive and autoparts industries, Ricupero notes that major national enterprises known for their capacity for technological innovation—Metal Leve, Freios Varga, Cofap—suffered immediate degradation after being sold to multinationals. Here the coefficient of import penetration rose from 8 per cent in 1993 to 25 per cent in 1996. The story has been the same in the telecommunications and computer sectors, where multinationals have largely suspended local research and development and transferred engineers from labs to marketing, production, sales and technical assistance. In these conditions, Ricupero comments, ‘it is not surprising that the coefficient of import penetration jumped from 29 per cent in 1993 to 70 per cent in 1996’. Another study has found that between 1994 and 1997, local production of capital goods fell overall by 10 per cent. Denationalization, in other words, has been accompanied by a real measure of deindustrialization. [29]

Meanwhile, Brazil’s exports remain concentrated in traditional commodities—agricultural, agroindustrial and mineral—and the country has been unable to increase its share in world-manufacturing exports. A recent UNCTAD study shows that between 1980 and 1997, Brazil’s share in world exports of manufactures remained the same, 0.7 per cent, and, significantly, that its share in world manufacturing value-added (income) fell from 2.9 per cent to 2.7 percent. Comparatively, while Chile and Mexico were able to increase manufacturing exports during the same period, 0.0 to 0.1 per cent and 0.2 to 2.2 per cent, respectively, Chile’s value-added remained the same, 0.2 per cent, and Mexico’s fell from 1.9 to 1.2 per cent. [30]


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2019-02-01 11:15 (ссылка)
What, finally, of the most important test of all—the indices of social progress under Cardoso’s rule? Eagerly associating himself with Clinton and Blair as a companion spirit in the South, Cardoso—who in the eighties had spoken of himself as a social-democrat, and headed a party (the PSDB) calling itself such—preferred the vaguer recipes of the Third Way once in power. Few have many illusions in the Anglo-American versions of this nostrum, now widely discredited in its homelands. In the very different conditions of Brazil, has it acquired more substance?

Table 3 compares the rates of growth and industrialization under Kubitschek and the ‘miracle’ years of military rule, with those under Cardoso. The contrast is arresting. In the former, GDP per capita grew at an average rate of 6.1 per cent between 1957–61 and 8.4 per cent between 1968–73, whereas between 1995 and 2001 Cardoso’s neoliberal experiment delivered an average growth of GDP of 2.4 per cent, and per capita of just 1.0 per cent.

Comparing not periods but countries, the results are also striking. Of the four main neoliberal experiments in Latin America, Brazil certainly did better than Argentina, where the model eventually collapsed, yielding overall figures of 0.9 and –0.3 per cent. But it did markedly less well than the other two stars of neoliberalism: Chile registered GDP growth of 4.8 and per capita of 3.4 per cent, Mexico 3.1 and 1.4 per cent. More starkly still, under the successive impact of the Russian crisis, the collapse of the Plano Real in 1999, and initial contagion from the Argentine crisis of 2001, per capita income in Brazil fell in dollar terms from $4,940 in 1997 to $2,920 in 2001—a regression to the levels of the 1980s; while GDP itself dropped from $807 billion to $503 billion, demoting the country from its rank as the eighth largest economy in the world, and placing Mexico as the first in Latin America in total economic output, with a GDP in 2001 of $618 billion. [32]

The inevitable consequence of such sluggish long-term growth, as elsewhere in Latin America, has been massive urban unemployment. According to official figures, which systematically underestimate the real rate, open unemployment rose from 4.6 per cent in 1995 to 7.6 per cent in 1998 and 1999, and 9 per cent by March 2000. [33] Other estimates reckon that open unemployment in São Paulo, the industrial heartland of Brazil, rose from 13.2 per cent in 1995 to 19.3 in 1999, and reached 20.4 per cent in May 2002, higher than the official 17.4 per cent reported for Argentina in 2001 just before its collapse. [34] This social failure has been a direct result of the massacre of small and medium enterprises, under the twin pressures of very high interest rates and sweeping trade liberalization. Such unemployment figures reveal a depth of social exclusion that does much to explain the rise of urban violence in Brazil during the Cardoso presidency. The latest data show that Brazil has climbed the ranks of Latin American countries for homicides to near the very top, with a coefficient of 19.12 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1992 rising to no less than 26.18 today.

If we turn to education, Cardoso has made some progress in reducing illiteracy in Brazil, according to official definitions, from 18.3 per cent of the population in 1990 to 14.7 per cent in 2000; although some 18 million Brazilians still cannot read or write and the average number of years of schooling of the economically active population is only 5.5, putting Brazil alongside Guatemala and Nicaragua. Argentina, Chile, and even Mexico come off much better, with illiteracy rates of 3.1, 4.3, and 9.0 respectively, and much higher average number of years of schooling: 10.1, 9.0 and 7.4. Infant mortality has also fallen, from 38.4 per cent in 1994 to 29.6 per cent in 2000, to the credit of the regime. But the Northeast, the poorest region of the country, continues to suffer from the appallingly high rate of 44 per cent. If infant mortality in Argentina and Chile is lower, 24.3 and 14 per cent, in Mexico it is higher than in Brazil, at 34.0 per cent. Set against these modest gains are the reverses of Cardoso’s second term. Between 1999 and 2001 average real wages fell 10 per cent, and government researchers themselves estimate that by 1999 absolute poverty had increased to 34.1 per cent of the population, some 53 million people, with another 22.6 million, or 14.5 per cent of the population, condemned to indigence. If Brazil does not compare well in these respects with Argentina or Chile (19.7 and 4.8, and 20.6 and 5.7 per cent), absolute poverty is more widespread in Mexico, 46.9 per cent in 1998, and indigence stands at 18.5 per cent. [35]

Lastly, what of income distribution? Despite claims by Cardoso and his economic team that currency stabilization was the best social policy, inequality remains one of the most scandalous in the world—the countries with the four highest Gini coefficients are, in rank order, Nicaragua, Brazil, South Africa and Malawi. As Table 4 illustrates, in 1999 the richest 10 per cent of the population enjoyed 47.4 per cent of the national income and the poorest 40 per cent a mere 8.1 per cent.

In fact, the neoliberal model in Latin America has increased inequality everywhere, the Gini coefficients in Argentina, Chile and Mexico all rising through the nineties. But according to ECLAC, in 1999 Brazil was the only country in Latin America in which more than half of the population had less than 50 per cent of the mean income. [36] Modest progress in literacy, health and reduction of poverty have not been able to redeem mediocre growth rates, high unemployment, vertiginous inequality and spreading urban violence and criminality.

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2019-02-01 11:22 (ссылка)
The current crisis in Brazil, in fact, is to a great extent due to Cardoso’s over-dependence on multinationals and international financial institutions to develop Brazil’s economy. As an ECLAC study of Brazil’s services sector shows, multinationals never act as agents of national development. The major goal of multinationals is to gain access to the national market rather than to maximize exports, not to speak of creating employment. Again, access to local markets is obtained not so much through the creation of new facilities as by purchasing existing assets. Therefore, the host country rarely earns any additional foreign exchange from exports of products made by multinationals.

On the other hand, removal of protectionist barriers, a crucial aspect of liberalization, results in surging imports, leading to an inexorable rise in the trade deficit of these countries. Brazil is no exception. While, in the early 1990s, Brazil was running a trade surplus to the tune of US$10-15 billion a year, by 1997 it was transformed into a deficit of US$8.3 billion. The pegged exchange rate, which Cardoso held on to for long, furthered Brazil’s woes by making Brazilian exports expensive compared to those of its competitors with flexible exchange rate regimes.

Unrealistically over-valued currencies in an open economy sooner or later spark off speculation about imminent devaluation. This in turn leads everyone to converting the domestic currency into US dollars, putting even greater pressure on the former. Often, the national government is forced to suspend conversion or freeze accounts, partially or entirely, to prevent mass withdrawal of domestic deposits from banks by nervous investors who fear that inevitable devaluation will greatly diminish their holdings in real terms and therefore want to convert their holdings into US dollars. The rising demand for US dollars makes the country even more dependent on foreign capital and leads to an unsustainable current account deficit. Even a momentary lapse of investor confidence in the performance of the economy results in capital flight, leaving the country’s economy in the lurch.

Brazil under Cardoso has been a classic case of the above. In a bid to attract more foreign capital, the country raised its interest rates too high, encouraging the entry of short-term speculative funds that are prone to overnight escapades. The crisis worsened in late 2000 when Brazil was hit by a series of international shocks – recession in the global economy, a looming default in Argentina, a domestic energy crisis triggered by investment cuts and a mal-advised privatization programme. Inflow of foreign capital fell sharply and the currency depreciated further. Cardoso raised interest rates again in early 2001 in a bid to prevent the outflow of foreign capital. And he begged the IMF to help Brazil regain the confidence of international financial markets. The IMF agreed, in August 2001, to a new fifteen-month Stand-by Agreement. The deal was worth US$15 billion, with an immediate tranche of US$5 billion to boost foreign reserves. In exchange, Cardoso agreed to raise Brazil’s primary budget surplus from 3 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 3.35 per cent in 2001 and 3.5 per cent in 2002. To be eligible for the recently negotiated US$30 billion loan, the percentage has been raised even further to 3.75, a rate that has to be maintained till 2005.

This, then, is the genesis of the crisis Cardoso has landed Brazil in. Ironic, for Cardoso had initially entered the political arena as a bitter critic of ‘dependent development’, criticizing the association of national with international capital in the periphery of the world system for perpetuating “deep social and economic inequalities, loss of control over the direction of national development, and vulnerability to external financial shocks”. In his former incarnation, he had said that dependent development “occurs because both state and business pursue policies that create markets based on concentration of income and social exclusion of most of the population. . . . The conflicts between the state and big business are not as antagonistic as the contradictions between the dominant classes and the people.”


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2019-02-01 13:19 (ссылка)
Ты б еще библию процитировал. Или журнал Watchtower.

Кардозу ровно в той же степени монетарист, что Лула, не пиши хуйню. Их экономическая политика одна и та же. Деньги стабилизировали к 96 году примерно, в 2000 начался рост (начался бы раньше, если бы не азиатский кризис). Монетаризм это в Аргентине,

Но если у тебя религиозные убеждения и жрунал Watchtower, тут ничего не поделаешь конечно.

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2019-02-01 13:56 (ссылка)
у меня нет убеждений, я просто много с местными общаюсь

впрочем, "вашингтонский консенсус" (радикальный монетаризм и неолиберализм,
пиночет/кардозо/кавалло-стайл) в латине ничего, кроме ужасов, не принес,
с этим никто особо не спорит, кроме фанатов трампа и чайной партии

>ровно в той же степени монетарист, что Лула

он пол-Бразилии приватизировал, коррупционным образом
(то есть продавал ТНК всякий хайтек, задешево, который
они сразу же и закрывали)

у тебя и Чубайс наверное не монетарист

Cardoso's administration deepened the privatization program launched by president Fernando Collor de Mello. During his first term, several government-owned enterprises in areas such as steel milling, telecommunications and mining, such as Telebras and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce were sold to the private sector, the deepest denationalisation in Brazilian history, amidst a polarized political debate between "neoliberals" and "developmentalists". Ironically, this time Cardoso was against the latter group, generating uproar among former academic colleagues and political allies who accused him of reneging his previous intellectual work. Economists still contend over its long-term effects; research shows that companies sold by the government achieved better profitability as a result of their disengagement from the state.[30]

Despite the sale of public assets, the years 1995 to 2002 saw a rise of the total public debt from 30% to 55.5% of GDP. Economists aligned with his government argued that this was due to external factors outside the control of the administration at the time, such as the devaluation of the Brazilian real and the growth of the share of the debt denominated in US dollars.[31] Nevertheless, devaluation of the currency was an instrument of monetary policy used right after his reelection, when the real pegged to the dollar led to a financial crisis that saw the country lose much of its foreign reserve fund and raise its interest rates on government bonds to very high levels as he tried to stabilize the currency under a new free-floating regime. With this economic shift, the greatest achievement of Cardoso - his landmark lowering of inflation - was maintained, but his popularity plummeted.

Given his previous experience as Minister of Foreign Affairs and his prestige as an internationally famous sociologist, he was respected on the world scene, building friendships with such leaders as Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo. Although he was respected abroad, in Brazil he had problems gaining support in Congress for government priorities and among people in general. As a result, major reforms planned by the executive branch, such as changes in the tax system and to social security, were only partially approved and only after long discussion. Although he claiming to still support social democracy, his economic policies led people on the left to identify him with neoliberalism and right-wing politics, terms that often carry a very negative connotation in Latin American political debate and academic circles.


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2019-02-01 20:40 (ссылка)
>he claiming to still support social democracy, his economic policies led people on the left to identify him with neoliberalism

Во-во -- а что про него думают "people of the left" и прочие читатели Сторожевой башни, никого не ебет.

Что он приватизировал, я не знаю, наверно хуйню какую-нибудь бессмысленную; Ембраер как при генералах сделали, так он и был всю дорогу, и то же про все компании, продукцию которых ты можешь назвать. Экономический рост начался при нем. При нем стабилизировали валюту, при нем же ее смогли отпустить (в отличие от Аргентины), the rest is history. Единственная экономическая инновация Лулы это социальные программы, чисто экономический эффект от которых вроде бы пренебрежимо мал (и не предполагался сразу большим, это скорее на будущее).

Что до местных -- ну, ты поговори еще с жителями Беркли на второй день после избрания Трампа, они тебе и не такого расскажут. А так-то, мне естественно все тоже местные объясняли, разные, over the years.

(Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

2019-02-01 21:27 (ссылка)

>Ембраер как при генералах сделали, так он и был всю
> дорогу

ебу дался?

Born from a Brazilian government plan, and having been
state-run from the beginning,[8] Embraer began a
privatization process during the government of Itamar
Franco.[15] This was a period of privatization for many
state-controlled companies in Brazil. Embraer was sold on
December 7, 1994

там после приватизации, по слухам, все сильно поплохело
(но по пизде пошло только при Темере, который его
окончательно добил, кажется, и продал Боингу)

(Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

2019-02-01 21:58 (ссылка)
>там после приватизации, по слухам, все сильно поплохело

В смысле, контроль 50% мирового рынка -- после приватизации, не до -- это поплохело? Ну-ну.

Если там все остальные приватизации такие же, людям памятник надо ставить.

>только при Темере

Темер правил полтора года. Как он мог хоть на что-то повлиять? Максимум зафиксировать состоявшийся факт.

Ей-богу, люди в своем state of denial совсем охуели. А ты за ними повторяешь. Я их понимаю конечно, президент-фашик, стремно и неприятно, но все же.

(Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

2019-02-02 03:28 (ссылка)

>Как он мог хоть на что-то повлиять

очень просто, он ее продал Боингу

(Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

2019-02-02 03:38 (ссылка)

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2019-02-02 05:23 (ссылка)
После того, как Аэробус купил Бомбардир. Не было вариантов уже.

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