tiphareth: ПЛЕВОК В ЛИЦО МНЕ И МОИМ КОЛЛЕГАМ

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	kaledin 2020-06-17 02:12 (ссылка)
	А вот не факт, что это сильно хорошо. Просто хорошие это одно, но там реально как у лоеров. А лоеры известно кто такие. (Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

	(Анонимно) 2020-06-17 19:28 (ссылка)
	люди полезным делом занимаются, на минуточку, лечат больных людей - в отличие от большинства сраных лоеров (Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

kaledin
2020-06-17 22:26 (ссылка)

Запредельные зарплаты просто так не бывают: к ним прилагается абсурд типа $70,000 за один день госпитализации, куча ошивающегося рядом жулья и ворья, и безумная сошедшая с ума страховая система. И огромное бабло за malpractice insurance. Иногда лучше меньше, да лучше.

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(Анонимно)
2020-06-17 23:37 (ссылка)

>абсурд типа $70,000 за один день госпитализации, куча ошивающегося рядом жулья и ворья, и безумная сошедшая с ума страховая система. И огромное бабло за malpractice insurance.

претензии к лоерам и страховщикам понятны; претензии к зарплатам врачей по-прежнему выглядят полностью высосанными из пальца.

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	kaledin 2020-06-18 03:37 (ссылка)
	Это связанные вещи потому что, потому и претензии. (Ответить) (Уровень выше) (Ветвь дискуссии)

	(Анонимно) 2020-06-18 10:33 (ссылка)
	>Это связанные вещи может быть; но имхо не определяющие размер зарплаты врачей (Ответить) (Уровень выше)

tiphareth
2020-06-18 06:27 (ссылка)

угу
про страховую систему очень хорошо у Тейбби,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griftopia
(гениальная книга вообще)

если вкратце, страховка это гигантский рэкет,
который (через коррупционное лоббирование)
освобожден от любых механизмов антимонопольного
контроля, присущих всем остальным секторам финансового
рынка, по факту - огромная, бесконтрольная,
грабительская финансовая пирамида напополам с мафией.

The epic struggle to pass health care reform was at once a
shameless betrayal of the public trust of historic
proportions and proof that a nation that perceives itself
as being divided into red and blue should start paying
attention to a third color that rules the day in
Washington-a sort of puke-colored politics that puts
together deals like this one and succeeds largely through
its mastery of the capital city's bureaucracy. The
defining characteristic of puke politics is that if it
must have government at all, the government should be
purposely ineffectual almost across the board in terms of
the functions we usually ascribe to the state and really
only competent in one area, and that's giving away
taxpayer money in return for campaign contributions.

"If a bunch of construction contractors got together and
decided to set the prices of bricks and mortar, they'd all
go to prison," says Robert Hunter of the Consumer
Federation of America, who served as a federal insurance
administrator under President Ford. "But in insurance,
it's all legal."

Any industry that basically has government license to (a)
fix prices and (b) refuse to uphold legal contracts is
going to make money almost without regard to the economic
climate.

That helps explain why in 2005, despite the fact that it
was blindsided by Katrina, one of the biggest natural
disasters in American history, the property/casualty
industry made an after-tax profit of $48.8 billion-a new
record, beating out the previous year's record of $40.5
billion.

* * *

McCarran spent much of his career tilting at communist
conspiracy windmills and with great fanfare got passed the
McCarran-Walter Act, which imposed quotas on certain types
of immigrants. He also passed the McCarran Internal
Security Act, which forced political parties like the
American Communist Party to register with the federal
government. Despite his fetish for wielding federal power,
McCarran had a very different opinion about its purview
over business and worked feverishly to keep the government
off the backs of the insurance companies. In 1944 he
teamed up with Homer Ferguson, a Michigan senator who also
had a flair for the anticompetitive, to pass the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Hilariously, Ferguson too was the
inspiration for a corrupt senator of cinema yore. If
you've seen the underrated Jeff Bridges movie Tucker, the
Ferguson character is played by Lloyd Bridges; he's the
federal heavy working with the big automakers to make sure
the upstart automaker/inventor Preston Tucker spent his
days battling phantom federal investigations instead of
making cheap, efficient cars that might have challenged
the big three, which incidentally are basically all
bankrupt now. Working together, these two dumbasses
McCarran and Ferguson passed their law, which essentially
invalidated the U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association Supreme Court decision and established the
ground rules for decades of insurance robbery.

Even the way this unseemly mess of a bill was passed was
an embarrassment to the whole concept of democracy. The
bill that McCarran and Ferguson introduced to the Senate
and which also passed in the House was originally written
to maintain the authority of the states over the insurance
industry, but it also expressly included a provision
maintaining that the Sherman Act would apply if and when
the state laws proved inadequate. The original
McCarran-Ferguson Act was also intended, quite explicitly,
to be temporary, and according to the original text was
supposed to expire in 1947. Because the bill as written
did not seem all that controversial, and would in any case
be temporary, it sailed through both the House (where it
was passed by the Judiciary Committee without a debate)
and the Senate with very limited discussion, to say
nothing of opposition. Even Franklin Roosevelt, when he
signed the bill into law, was absolutely explicit that it
was designed to expire in the near future. "After a
moratorium period, the antitrust laws," Roosevelt said at
the signing ceremony, "will be applicable in full force
and effect to the business of insurance." But here's the
thing about Congress. No matter how much any bill is
debated in either the House or the Senate, it can always
be rewritten, even written to have an opposite meaning, in
the conference committee process, which takes place after
bills have been passed in both houses.

In this case, the McCarran-Ferguson Act emerged from
conference with an important new clause added: it said
that after January 1, 1948, the Sherman, Clayton, and
Federal Trade Commission acts "shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law." In other words, instead of
being a temporary moratorium designed to explicitly allow
the Sherman Act to come into play when state laws proved
inadequate, the law now was a permanent act that
explicitly excluded the application of the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Antitrust Act (an extension of Sherman that
prohibited other forms of collusion and intimidation), and
the FTC Act in any case where there were already existing
state laws. Thus the insurance industry was given a
permanent license to steal. There were all sorts of ways
in which insurance companies, freed of federal regulatory
authority, could collude to manipulate prices. Among other
things, they pooled loss information and were allowed
legally to set prices through cartel-like organizations
such as the Insurance Services Office (ISO). The same
sorts of corporate-crime activities that are outlined in
great cloak-and-dagger detail in books like Kurt
Eichenwald's The Informant-which described the high-stakes
efforts of a group of agricultural conglomerates to evade
the FBI and foreign police agencies while they
surreptitiously colluded to set the prices of a feed
product called lysine-are done openly and legally in the
insurance world.

"If a bunch of construction contractors got together and
decided to set the prices of bricks and mortar, they'd all
go to prison," says Robert Hunter of the Consumer
Federation of America, who served as a federal insurance
administrator under President Ford. "But in insurance,
it's all legal." Insurance companies could also collude to
threaten boycotts or worse, depending on (a) how big their
market share was or (b) how small a state they were
dealing with, meaning how totally they had the local
population by the balls. A great example of the kind of
bullshit that goes on all the time in insurance is the
state of Mississippi, which became famous as one of the
racketeering capitals of America even before Katrina. Back
in 2003 there was a much-ballyhooed malpractice crisis in
which newspaper and TV reporters flooded the state to
describe a tort system run amok, where patients in pursuit
of big malpractice claims-what was called "jackpot
justice" by groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
repeated by their stooges in the media and Congress-hit up
doctors for bogus settlements. While some of this
undeniably went on, what was far less publicized was the
insurance industry's unique response to this crisis. "We
had a malpractice crisis in Mississippi," says Brian
Martin, an aide to Congressman Gene Taylor. "The insurance
companies basically said, 'We're going to stop issuing
malpractice insuranceto ob-gyns, neurosurgeons, and
emergency room doctors, unless Mississippi passes tort
reform.'" Crucially, this wasn't one company making the
threat, and the threat wasn't to pull insurance for
doctors who'd been sued. This was a whole group of
supposed competitors acting in concert, threatening to
abandon whole classes of doctors, regardless of their
records. Taylor had been a state senator in Mississippi
and in that capacity had actually supported tort reform to
rein in excessive settlement awards, which he believed
were a real problem. But once he reached Congress he
started to notice a pattern. "As soon as the stock market
started going in the tank and insurance companies weren't
making enough money, suddenly there was always a tort
reform crisis," explains his aide Martin. Then in 2005
Katrina happened, and that's where we really saw the fangs
of the antitrust exemption. Government agencies determined
that there were at least four hours of hurricane-force
winds during the storm surge, and it was obvious to
everyone in the area that wind accounted for much of the
damage-I myself was in the Biloxi area shortly after the
storm and saw houses miles inland simply blown down. "You
had people who were standing in their houses when the wind
blew them down," Marvin Koury, a real estate adviser in
Gulfport, Mississippi, told me back then, "and the
insurance companies were trying to tell them it was
flood."

Despite that fact and despite the fact that in larger,
better-regulated states like Louisiana insurance companies
paid out huge claims to homeowners for wind damage, in
Mississippi the local insurance cartel-in this case an ad
hoc union of State Farm, Allstate, Nationwide, USAA, and
many others-decided en masse to deny all claims for wind
damage except for those that the homeowner could
demonstrate took place separate from flood damage. State
Farm's statement right after Katrina went as follows:

Where wind acts concurrently with flooding to cause damage
to the insured property, coverage for the loss exists only
under flood coverage, if available.

Nationwide issued a similar statement, telling adjusters
that "if loss is caused by wind and flood there is no
coverage." Why pass the buck from wind to flood? That's
easy-there was a federal, taxpayer-backed program to cover
flood damage! In this case the National Flood Insurance
Program issued many ruined homeowners checks from Uncle
Sam to repair their flooded houses. And in a supreme bit
of irony, the federal government contracted out to private
companies to issue those rewards, even as some of those
same companies were denying their own wind coverage.

"So here's State Farm," explains Martin, "running around,
saying, here's your $250,000 from the government for your
flood damage, but oh, by the way, we don't see any wind
damage." Taylor's home was one of the ones State Farm
decided not to cover, which was bad enough-messing with a
U.S. congressman. But the insurers were so brazen they
denied coverage to Trent fucking Lott, who at the time was
not very far removed from being the Senate majority
leader, undoubtedly one of the most powerful men in
America (to say nothing of Mississippi). What was State
Farm's final offer to Trent Lott, who wanted this
out-of-state insurer to pay the claim on his home? Its
final answer was:

Nothing. Not even the fee for the gaming license, which I
would appreciate if you would put up personally...

And that's not even a joke. Lott ultimately was forced to
sue State Farm for refusing to pay up for wind damage to
his home. He later issued a statement: Today I have joined
in a lawsuit against my longtime insurance company because
it will not honor my policy, nor those of thousands of
other South Mississippians, for coverage against wind
damage due to Hurricane Katrina.

The thing of it was, neither Lott nor anyone else could do
a damn thing, legally, about these sorts of moves by
insurance companies. Way back in 1980, an amendment to the
Federal Trade Commission Act had been passed making it
basically illegal for the federal government not only to
investigate the insurance industry but even to conduct
studies in that area. That change had come about when the
FTC had begun making noise about investigating the
industry's practice of charging higher property and
casualty insurance premiums based on credit scores. Almost
immediately the industry had lobbied to preempt this
investigation, and section 6 amending the FTC Act was
passed. In the report accompanying the amendment it was
written that "under the amendment, the FTC's investigative
and reporting powers [emphasis mine] are made explicitly
inapplicable to the business of insurance." Any industry
that basically has government license to (a) fix prices
and (b) refuse to uphold legal contracts is going to make
money almost without regard to the economic climate. That
helps explain why in 2005, despite the fact that it was
blindsided by Katrina, one of the biggest natural
disasters in American history, the property/casualty
industry made an after-tax profit of $48.8 billion—a new
record, beating out the previous year's record of $40.5
billion.

In 2006, with no hurricane to muddy the waters, the
industry made a whopping after-tax profit of $68.1
billion.

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	tiphareth 2020-06-18 06:28 (ссылка)
	https://silo.pub/griftopia-the-great-derangement.html (Ответить) (Уровень выше)

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