My fault, bad choice of language: not "intent", original text as is. The point is still valid, though - judiciary is a feedback mechanism, not an actuator. I can't find that Scalia article in NYer online, but there were couple quotes from Scalia, essentially saying - if you don't like the text, go and change it; but until it is unchanged I will read it word for word.

What I am trying to say here, is that if you believe in democratic process, originalist point of view should be very appealing. Whether the democratic constitutional process in the US is flexible enough to accomodate social change is another matter. But you can hardly blame unelected judges for a refusal to go beyond original words of the law book.

http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/scalia97.pdf
Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism, which is a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be - though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.

And guess who gets to play the voice of reason...

The strangeness of Scalia's position is that the courts strive to read the Constitution in accord with the public understanding of it, and Scalia strives to prevent the Constitution to be understood in accordance with its popular meaning, while calling the courts undemocratic.

pg 98, your link: "It does not mean that I am to dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statue is designed; or could be designed to serve; or that I am unaware that new times require new laws. It means only that I believe judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write new laws."

To me as a legeal layman Scalia's position has more intellectual integrity than those of his opponents. I think you are mixing "democratic" and "social". Per Scalia, courts are undemocratic by design, and they are involved in undemocratic practices when they pursue lawmaking, for social causes or otherwise. His example for the Chutrch of the Holy Trinity vs. the US is a great illustration (pg. ninetysomething).

What IS ironic in his position is that he grants common law judges the right to make laws (because it works and does not threaten his conservative position, I guess), while prohibiting statutory judges to do the same.

I agree that the Church case is pretty ugly and I agree with Scalia that the intent of lawmakers is not what a judge is supposed to search for.

What I do disagree with is that the 18th century readers were uniquely good interpreters and/or philosophers.

I am also an originalist. We should take the text of 18th century and the philosophy of the time of the text and apply them to the modern conditions. I am for the original text and method but not for the original answers.

I am not sure (again, layman speaking!) that it is possible at all to "take the text of 18th century and the philosophy of the time of the text" without being arbitrary. "Philosophy" - being what? If the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights at the time of its inception constituted the most revolutionary philosophy of the day, should the courts of 1920s have been guided by the most revolutionary theory if their day, i.e. Marxism-Leninism?

I mean, mixing "philosophy" in is, essentially, evaluating a degree to which this philosophy was "good" from YOUR point of view. You would say that the philosophy of the Founders was to create the most just country in the world, given the limitations of the time; hence it implies equality and other nice things. However, enter a neo-Nazi, and he would argue that the philosophy of the Founders was to afford protection to white male property owners, so the coloreds are screwed, etc. - and from the formal point of view his theory is as valid as yours. Philosophy, to me, seems a shaky basis to build on.