Американская Конституция прямо отсылает к господствуюшим в обществе нормам. Скажем, запрещается "необычное и жестокое наказание". Что такое "необычное и жестокое"? То, что было необычным и жестоким в 18 веке? Или то, что общество считает необычным и жестоким сегодня?

У первой интерпретации есть проблема: если законодатель хотел запретить четвертование, то почему бы это не написать сразу? Мне кажется, что вторая интрепретация вполне разумна.

Посмотрите авторитетный комментарий (я вообще им всегда пользуюсь - очень полезная вещь):

During congressional consideration of this provision one Member objected to "the import of [the words] being too indefinite" and another Member said: "No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it would be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind." It is clear from some of the complaints about the absence of a bill of rights including a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments in the ratifying conventions that tortures and barbarous punishments were much on the minds of the complainants, but the English history which led to the inclusion of a predecessor provision in the Bill of Rights of 1689 indicates additional concern with arbitrary and disproportionate punishments. Though few in number, the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting this guarantee have applied it in both senses.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment08/03.html

То есть как раз интерпретация ЭТОГО пункта (на который здесь очень часто ссылаются как нуждающийся в интерпретации) особых трудностей не вызывала и источником законодательного творчества судов не стала.

What is, I think, truly ironic, is that the concept of the Constitution as a "living document" in practice reduces the power of elected representatives, increasing the power of the Wise Old Men/Women interpreting the thing.

The living document justification was - mostly - used to advance social reforms. Some of such reforms, in retrospect, seem to be well timed (if not overdue; such as the end of segregation). What it means, is that democratic mechanisms in America were too slow in reacting to change and had to be replaced by the Platonic "rule of philosophers" (otherwise, the concept of the living Constitution would not have even arised).

However, instead of trying to fix the mechanisms of constitutional updates, liberals advance the undemocratic process by advocating Supreme Court's extendeed powers. I like my Miranda and my equal rights, but I'd like them to come from the legislature (is that too much to ask of my Congressfolk?... err, maybe, look at some of them).

Во-первых, стала. Недавние решения ВС об отмене смертной казни для слабоумных, а потом для несовершеннолетних основывались именно на этой поправке. И именно с упомянутой мотивировкой: раньше общество не считало такое жестоким, а теперь считает. Во-вторых, в Конституции ещё масса таких мест есть. Нельзя отчуждать имущество без "reasonable compensation" -- что такое reasonable? Нельзя осуждать человека без due process -- что такое due process? Можно ли сказать, что раньше общество присутствие адвоката на допросе не считало due, а теперь считает?

раньше общество не считало такое жестоким, а теперь считает

Именно! Вот это и есть ключевой пойнт. Что такое "общество считает"? Как выяснить, что общество уже считает, а что еще не считает? И как инкорпорировать это считание в право? Идея демократического государства, весьма тщательно прописанная в конституции, дает на это однозначный ответ - мнение общества выражается посредством демократической процедуры выборов, а мнение по поводу конституционных вопросов - посредством особой процедуры, требующей квалифицированного большинства. Именно для этого, в частности, придуманы периодические перевыборы - чтобы все время перепроверять мнение общества.

Можно ли сказать, что раньше общество присутствие адвоката на допросе не считало due, а теперь считает?

Можно. Если конгресс примет закон об этом, то в рамках демократической парадигмы можно будет сказать, что общество решило то-то и то-то.

Вот тут как раз процедура понятна: ВС чётко объясняет, почему он считает, что в обществе господствует именно такое представление. Они исследуют законодательство штатов и прецеденты как в федеральных судах, так и в судах штатов, и пытаются доказать, что есть консенсус.

Как-то нехорошо получается. Если в каком-то штате есть консеснсус - он уже выражен в законодательстве, или будет выражен. Если консенсуса нету - то и суд не должен вмеиваться. Этот аргумент звучит типа "мы чувствуем, что избиратели поддерживают эту меру, так зачем какие-то выборы-шмыборы устраивать, вот мы ее просто узаконим и все!"

Единственная причина для суда вмешиваться - это как раз, если среди избирателей консенсуса нету.

Да, кстати, принимая это решение, Верховный Суд забубенил вообще феноменальную вещь - они сослались, если я не ошибаюсь, на практику в других странах. Мне только интересно - разве это не прямое нарушение их присяги?

Ну, если вспомнить, что Миранда была принята в верхновном суде пятью голосами против четырех, то говорить о консенсусе мне кажется не совсем правильным...

Eh... Not liking Scalia and his record, that is not what he says. In the last week's New Yorker there was a huge article about him, and what he essentially said on many occasions is that the Justices are the keepers of the writers' intent, not interpreters of it. You want social change? - go and amend the Constitution. You can call it conservative tricks, but he never said the Constitution should stay AS it was written in 18th century forever. He just said change should be handled by elected bodies.

http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/scalia97.pdf

I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be Framers - Hamilton’s and Madison’s writings in the Federalist, for example. I do so, however, not because they were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood. Thus, I give equal weight to Jay’s pieces in the Federalist, and to Jefferson’s writings, even though neither of them was a Framer. What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.

My fault, bad choice of language: not "intent", original text as is. The point is still valid, though - judiciary is a feedback mechanism, not an actuator. I can't find that Scalia article in NYer online, but there were couple quotes from Scalia, essentially saying - if you don't like the text, go and change it; but until it is unchanged I will read it word for word.

What I am trying to say here, is that if you believe in democratic process, originalist point of view should be very appealing. Whether the democratic constitutional process in the US is flexible enough to accomodate social change is another matter. But you can hardly blame unelected judges for a refusal to go beyond original words of the law book.

http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/scalia97.pdf
Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism, which is a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be - though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.

And guess who gets to play the voice of reason...

The strangeness of Scalia's position is that the courts strive to read the Constitution in accord with the public understanding of it, and Scalia strives to prevent the Constitution to be understood in accordance with its popular meaning, while calling the courts undemocratic.

pg 98, your link: "It does not mean that I am to dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statue is designed; or could be designed to serve; or that I am unaware that new times require new laws. It means only that I believe judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write new laws."

To me as a legeal layman Scalia's position has more intellectual integrity than those of his opponents. I think you are mixing "democratic" and "social". Per Scalia, courts are undemocratic by design, and they are involved in undemocratic practices when they pursue lawmaking, for social causes or otherwise. His example for the Chutrch of the Holy Trinity vs. the US is a great illustration (pg. ninetysomething).

What IS ironic in his position is that he grants common law judges the right to make laws (because it works and does not threaten his conservative position, I guess), while prohibiting statutory judges to do the same.

I agree that the Church case is pretty ugly and I agree with Scalia that the intent of lawmakers is not what a judge is supposed to search for.

What I do disagree with is that the 18th century readers were uniquely good interpreters and/or philosophers.

I am also an originalist. We should take the text of 18th century and the philosophy of the time of the text and apply them to the modern conditions. I am for the original text and method but not for the original answers.

I am not sure (again, layman speaking!) that it is possible at all to "take the text of 18th century and the philosophy of the time of the text" without being arbitrary. "Philosophy" - being what? If the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights at the time of its inception constituted the most revolutionary philosophy of the day, should the courts of 1920s have been guided by the most revolutionary theory if their day, i.e. Marxism-Leninism?

I mean, mixing "philosophy" in is, essentially, evaluating a degree to which this philosophy was "good" from YOUR point of view. You would say that the philosophy of the Founders was to create the most just country in the world, given the limitations of the time; hence it implies equality and other nice things. However, enter a neo-Nazi, and he would argue that the philosophy of the Founders was to afford protection to white male property owners, so the coloreds are screwed, etc. - and from the formal point of view his theory is as valid as yours. Philosophy, to me, seems a shaky basis to build on.